

The roots of stagnation of the peasants' social movement in Kalibakar, South Malang

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ABSTRACT This paper embodies the complete results of our field research on the stagnation of the peasant movement in Kalibakar, South Malang. It aims to reveal the reasons behind the stagnation of Kalibakar peasant movement, and how it should be responded considering the peasants' struggle since the New Order era. The stagnation has severely hit the movement organization, Forum Komunikasi Petani Malang Selatan/ FORKOTMAS (The South Malang's Peasants Communication Forum), the spirit of the peasants, and the support from the involving networks. Such stagnation has directly impacted the sustainability of the struggle for the land reform idealized by the peasants. The scope and limitations of this research lie in the subjective micro perspectives from FORKOTMAS administrators and peasants on the stagnation of their organizations. This research employed Theory of Symbolic Interactionism by George H. Mead as a theoretical framework to analyze the obtained data, with the main theoretical concepts of mind, self, and society. Results showed that the peasants' thought (mind) did not consider their movement was stagnant in an absolute sense. The peasants regarded themselves have self-readiness (self) to change the orientation of the movement through the development of socio-economic organizations and/ or institutions, and education for the Kalibakar community. The peasants are also ready to continue efforts of land certification by optimizing the support network of Malang Raya community leaders (society). This research implies that the Kalibakar phenomenon is an articulation of a dynamic dialectic between the thoughts of peasants, themselves, and a wider Malang society.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Various forms of Kalibakar peasants movement has started since the post-Japanese colonialization, Dutch's Military Aggression II, The Old Order (Soekarno Era), The New Order (Soeharto Era), The 1998 Reformation, to today's Post-reformation Era. The main goal of this movement is a land reform to win the certificates of ownership (CO) of the former Kalibakar Plantation XII. The Kalibakar peasants movement takes place across six different villages, those are Simojayan, Tlogosari, Tirtoyudo, Kepatihan, Baturetno, and Bumirejo. Peasants of these six villages believe that the plantation lands, historically, have always been the property of their ancestors as the Japanese colonial let them cultivate it (Wahyudi, 2010).

Following the laws social movements, the Kalibakar peasants movement dynamically fluctuates, in which the movement energy is high at times but also decrease to its lowest point. The dynamics of social movements do not only articulate the motives of its actors (Tilly, 1978), but are also determined by the structural stability of socio-cultural, socio-economic, socio-political, and other macro-objective aspects (Puerta & Smelser, 1965; Smelser, 2013). This structure of social movement was portrayed by the

Kalibakar peasants. Even though the peasants are aware of the unfinished business in the form of land certification, there is no meaningful movement at the current state because the social structure has not opened the door for the resumption of the peasants movement.

The dynamics of the Kalibakar peasants movement are determined by five main elements, namely, the notable peasant figures, the FORKOTMAS, the movement organization network (*Lembaga Bantuan Hukum/LBH* (Legal Aid) Pos Malang and other NGOs), the regional elite activist network (politicians, religious leaders, bureaucrats, and campus activists), and the press. The synergy among these five components determine the rhythms and direction of the Kalibakar peasants movement. Less support toward these critical elements would decrease the power of movement.

Declining of the Kalibakar peasants movement started on the Post-reformation Era in 2001. It resulted in the stagnation of the Kalibakar peasants movement as a national phenomenon, which previously has succeeded in bringing peasants to obtain a number of ex-plantation lands inherited from their ancestors. Unfortunately, most of the reclaimed land has not yet been certified.

Ideally, the issue of the Kalibakar peasants movement is not solely related to land certificates, but also dealing with

the life of peasants' society with high integrity, solidarity, mutual cooperation, and kinship towards a more prosperous life. To achieve these, peasants movement play a pivotal role as a social instrument that ties them in a network with notable historical record for their struggle.

To this end, it is understood that the stagnation of the Kalibakar peasants movement poses a serious social problem. This is partly because external parties who wish that the peasants involved in the movement are not trapped in absurd pragmatic attitudes, which are actions and desire of only controlling the ex-plantation lands. The public hopes that the 'success' of *reclaiming* (as termed by the peasants) or *looting* (as termed by plantation) will be the starting point for the Kalibakar peasants to live a more 'independent' as they have always wanted. It is expected that the Kalibakar peasants movement will set as a national example in the land reform program to raise the dignity of peasants.

This present field research aims to raise the original character of activist movements in Indonesia. We contend that the Kalibakar phenomenon is more than ideographic data that merely explains the context of Kalibakar, but it should also be able to describe the character of social movements in Indonesia, especially concerning the tendency of shared attitudes or social morals of post-movement activists. Based on the information on the activists' character – which tend to be “quickly satisfied, incomplete, and prone to splitting the joint venture” – it can be seen that opportunities for advocacy of the movement is questionable.

In the tradition of peasants movements, such fluctuations do not only occur in Indonesia. The dynamic graphs of peasants movements worldwide is influenced by macro-objective conditions in the region, especially political factors (Claeys & Pugley, 2017; Henderson, 2017; Mc Michael, 2006; Nishizaki, 2014). In Indonesia, both emergences and absences of social movements is influenced by the reigning political leeway in the government. It is interesting that the law of social movement denotes that *the more chaotic the political situation, the weaker the legitimacy of the government, the more social movements appear*.

This research focuses on the micro-subjective thoughts of FORKOTMAS management and the figures behind peasants movement. It aims to dismantle the mindset of the actors causing the movement's stagnation. Results of this research is important to reveal the original thoughts of peasant activists, and their future agenda. Evidence gathered from this research will support the interested parties to develop a more structural and effective social movement for the empowerment of peasants in Kalibakar, South Malang.

In dismantling the micro-subjective thoughts of the movement actors, a micro theory by George Herbert Mead was chosen. The theory is Symbolic Interactionism related to the main concepts of *mind*, *self*, and *society* (Mead et al., 2015). Based on this theory, the articulation of the peasants' thoughts (*mind*) and themselves (*self*) in their social actions or behavior are dictated by the macro-objective party (*society*). Despite as a micro theory, Mead does not ignore the power of society in influencing individual action patterns. Mead understands society as a provider of organized responses taken over by individuals in the form of *me*. He states that *me* represents the voice and hope of society.

The theory of Symbolic Interactionism are employed to analyze the micro-world of FORKOTMAS administrators and the peasant figures of the Kalibakar movement in re-

sponding to the stagnation. We believe that both FORKOTMAS and the peasant figures have many visionary movement agendas for the life of the Kalibakar peasants. Indeed, the Kalibakar peasants have maintained the spirit of developing prosperous peasants society by formulating particular consensus that envisions their movement. If our assumption is true, a deeper exploration of the nature of the movement stagnation will be interesting.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Indonesia's peasant movement thus far has only been able to result in land tenure. Meanwhile, peasant organization was not only formed to do that, but also taking further steps in developing economic, educational, or cultural institutions in the society as the basis of the movement. Such stagnations on movement improvement was also experienced by the peasants of Kalibakar, South Malang; Sukamulya Village, Rumpin District, Bogor Regency; and also Curug Village and Tegal Wangi Village, Jasinga District (Rahmah & Soetarto, 2015; Lestari & Purwandari, 2015).

Similar phenomena to the aforementioned peasant movement are also documented in the historical records across Sumatra, Java, Sulawesi, and Maluku (Imadudin & Sofianto, 2012; Imadudin, 2015; Kamaruddin, 2012; Muntholib, 2009). This present research denotes that the peasant movement could only win the land they fought for to control the land per de facto, but not de jure because the peasants do not hold the certification of ownership/CO (*Surat Hak Milik* / SHM) on the existing land. It is noteworthy that the peasant movement can hardly continue because clashing struggles among economic, educational, and cultural improvement.

Therefore, it can be concluded that Indonesian peasants – from the colonial era to the present day – have never had the ability to develop modern movement organization with professional management. The success of the reclaiming/looting movement so far has been triggered by the unstable political situation, and supported by networking parties outside the peasants such as socio-religious, social and political organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), unscrupulous government officials, government security, and campus activists (Rahmah & Soetarto, 2015; Anggraini, 2011; Hamidah, 2010; Hartoyo, 2011; Imadudin & Sofianto, 2012; Ilyas, 2018; Imadudin, 2015; Iswari et al., 2018; Kamaruddin, 2012; Lestari & Purwandari, 2015; Muntholib, 2009; Purwandari & Kolopaking, 2012; Rachmawati et al., 2019; Susanto, 2015; Syawaludin, 2016).

Such model of peasant movement is not only found in Indonesia, but is well-documented in Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador, Peru, South Africa, and Thailand. (Baletti et al., 2008; Claeys & Pugley, 2017; Fernandes, 2013; Henderson, 2017; Nishizaki, 2014; Wolfrod, 2010). Findings from those studies similarly noted that peasants in Southeast Asia, South Africa, and Latin America, sociologically, occupy a lower social strata position, specifically as the lower-class society.

Despite their lower social stratification, the peasants refuse to be silenced, to surrender, or give up on the situation. They have always continued struggling to improve their life quality. Among the struggling media is through programs of organizational development, socio-economic institutions, and education in the area of the base of the movement. Unfortunately, changes take place in the orien-

tation of the peasants movement, and hamper its success (Rahmah & Soetarto, 2015; Hastiyanto, 2019; Iswari et al., 2018; Lestari & Purwandari, 2015; Mc Michael, 2006; Utara, 2010; Wolfrod, 2010).

3. METHOD

3.1 Theoretical framework and research design

The stagnation of the Kalibakar peasant movement can be paradigmatically viewed from various points of view. This present field research employed Social Definition Paradigm (SDP) by George Ritzer. The SDP ontologically sees the nature of reality in people's minds, along with the subjective norms internalized within. This perspective views humans as their thoughts (Ritzer, 2005). Guba and Lincoln named this paradigm as constructivism. They denotes that reality exists in one's mental construction (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Creswell states that:

“Individuals develop subjective meanings of their experiences—meanings directed toward certain objects or things. These meanings are varied and multiple, leading the researcher to look for the complexity of views rather than narrowing meanings into a few categories or ideas” Creswell (2009).

The aforementioned paradigm lends strong support to this present research on the stagnation of the social movement of Kalibakar peasants, South Malang. This present study employed a qualitative design with a descriptive approach to explore the thoughts of FORKOTMAS administrators and peasants' figures. This present research attempts to explicate the pattern of relations within the stagnation as understood by the research subjects.

3.2 Research participants

The subjects of this research are administrators and figures of the peasant movement. The data collection techniques were in-depth interviews with the Chairman and leaders of FORKOTMAS, and two leaders of the peasant movement. The interviews were conducted in natural settings to obtain direct social encounters; and through devices, such as telephone What's App Group (WAG). The researchers are members of the WAG named FORKOTMAS TETAP EXIS as administered by FORKOTMAS. This WAG was created on 8 April 2017 to facilitate communication between members and sympathizers of FORKOTMAS.

3.3 Data collection

The obtained data are in the forms of written and unwritten information, sorted and selected following the main theoretical concepts that guided the primary analysis. The data analysis process followed the formulation of research problems, as informed by the thoughts of FORKOTMAS management and the peasant figures.

Since being founded in 2001, the leaders of Kalibakar peasant movement, individually and informally, have managed to maintain the spirit of the movement. Several FORKOTMAS peasants informally maintain 'relationships' with community leaders and local government officials. This act is called *activation*, which is a prerequisite phase to mobilize a movement (Wahyudi, 2010).

3.4 Data analysis

The data validity was tested through data triangulation in the forms of data collection techniques and data sources. The researchers checked and cross-checked the research data to meet the principle of data saturation. The data was analyzed dialogically with the theoretical framework of Symbolic Interactionism by George H. Mead. The analyzed data was closely related to the main concepts of *mind, self (I and Me)*, and *society*.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Results

This section elaborates the research results with the following systematics: 1) the chronology of land reclaiming/ looting of Eks-PTPN XII Kalibakar; 2) the loss of support for the Kalibakar peasant movement network, and c) the recessive period of the Kalibakar peasant movement

4.1.1 The chronology of land reclaiming/ looting of Eks-PTPN XII Kalibakar

Reclaiming (as termed by the peasants) or looting (as termed by the plantation staff) began on 13 April 1993 for the 22.25 ha of Titisoro (TT) forest, located in the Afdeling Petungombo area. The area is currently located in Simojayan Village, Ampelgading District, Malang Regency. The reclaiming/ looting was conducted by approximately 100 peasants led by a charismatic peasants figure, who was also a village leader and a prominent social organization figure affiliated to the strongest political party at that time. The reason for the reclaiming/ looting was that the underground belonged to the village, not to Perhutani Indonesia. It was a guerrilla base when battling against the Dutch.

The second reclaiming/ looting was on 23 to 25 December 1997 against Afdeling Petungombo, covering an area of 240 Ha. About 400 to 500 peasants joined this second movement, led by the same leader (before his passing recently). The target of this second reclaiming/ looting was the land of the former PTPN plantation XII Kalibakar. The reason behind this reclaiming/ looting was underpinned by the social history records of peasants, in which the land was properties of the peasants' ancestors. Aside from its status as a gift from the Japanese colonial, the land was also abandoned by the government and managed by the peasants.

The reclaiming/ looting of the TT forest and the Petungombo afdeling was carried out in the New Order Era. Especially in Petungombo afdeling, the reclaiming/ looting took place when Indonesia was hit by an economic, monetary, and political crisis. This period was the political delegitimization of the Suharto government.

“The peasants saw, captured, and took chances from the economic and political crises to reclaim plantation land inherited from their ancestors,” reported one movement leader when interviewed at his home.

The third reclaiming/ looting took place on 13-16 June 1998, and the fourth reclaiming/ looting was on 23 July 1998. The target of reclaiming/ looting in this post-Soeharto regime was Sumber Tlogo, with a land area of 167.01 Ha. This time, the Kalibakar peasant movement was getting more solid, as expressed by the following excerpt.

“The peasants are getting bolder; the political tensions are relaxed because of the urgency of this movement. We estimate that about 1,000 Kalibakar peasants participated in clearing cocoa plantations,” said a figure in the movement.

The reclaiming/looting movement got more powerful as there was no meaningful security constraints or significant threats from the Indonesian government. This led to the fifth reclaiming/looting movement on 23-24 August 1998 to win a plantation area of 436.06 Ha in Afdeling Kalibakar. Following this, the sixth reclaiming/looting took place on 25 August 1998 on 601.33 hectares of plantation land in Afdeling Lebakarjo; and the seventh reclaiming/looting was carried out on 17 July to 19 September 1998 to win Afdeling Sumbergesing plantation area of 473.55 Ha. These movements gathered 1,000 to 1,500 peasants.

“Peasants across different villages helped each other,” said the movement leader.

The movement leaders admitted that The 1998 Reformation was the pinnacle behind the reclaiming/looting.

“Without Reformation, we believe that the Kalibakar peasants would not be able to control the ex-plantation lands, which all indeed belong to our ancestors,” stated the FORKOTMAS leader, who was also a peasant.

The movement leaders were grateful for The 1998 Reformation that opened up space and time for peasants to reclaim the ex-plantation land, which covers in a total of 1,940.2 hectares.

Based on the interview excerpts above, it can be concluded that the existence of its network largely determines the Kalibakar peasant movement. This movement can only work as supported by significant networks considering the macro-social and political situations. All periods of the peasant movement since the eras of Limited Network (1992-1993), Network Expansion (1996-1997), Peak Network (1998-2000), Declination (2001-2005), to the stagnation (2006-present) sufficiently articulate the critical support of networks along with the movement (Wahyudi, 2010). The more real, various, and strong networks present, the more successful the movement. Oppositely, the more missing, weak, and unclear networks present, the peasant faced more failure.

The main problems behind the reclaiming/looting peasant movement are illustrated as follows:

It can be seen from the diagram that the root of the Kalibakar problem is similar to any agrarian conflicts across many Indonesian regions, which was caused by the unresolved legacy from the Dutch. However, Kalibakar case is specified by a particular feature where the reclaiming/looting movement has succeeded the peasants to control their desired lands. Therefore, it would be very unfortunate if this movement faces its fate.

4.1.2 The weakening support of networks for Kalibakar peasant movements

The peak support for the Kalibakar peasant movement network occurred in 1998 when economic and political crises challenged Indonesia prior to the topple of Soeharto regime.




FIGURE 1. The chronology of reclaiming/looting of Kalibakar peasants

“There was no political party at that time that did not support the Kalibakar peasant movement. We obtained multiple forms of support, one of which included issuing an official letter from the peasants, approved by all factions in DPRD and Malang Regency. It stated that the central government gave the Kalibakar plantation area to the peasants,” said one movement figure.

The majority of our research respondents admitted that the Kalibakar peasant movement was highly dependent on the national socio-political stability, be it chaotic or ‘in orderly’. When chaotic, the government tends to neglect public security, which opens the door for peasants to carry out movements.

“The national socio-political situations greatly affect the dynamics of the Kalibakar movement. The Kalibakar community itself has always supported our movement. Perhaps there are those who disagree with us, but that’s a very small number,” said one of the respondents who support the establishment of Kalibakar schools.

Indeed, such opinion is supported by the fact that the movement took place during the Reformation Era in 1998. Kalibakar peasants could easily reclaim the former Dutch plantation area during that year as aimed by the movement. Neither the government nor the plantation security forces dared to hinder the reclaiming/looting movement carried out by peasants. This year is among the best moments for the reclaiming/looting movement in the former Kalibakar plantation.

The second condition that supports the reclaiming/looting movement was when the government gave a strong political signal for the peasants to take back their land, which has been considered to have been taken by ‘other parties’. This once happened when the late former President K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid called for peasants in his speech to take back their lands, which was taken by plantations and other irresponsible parties. Of course, the ‘political will’ was immediately welcomed positively by the peasants who were fighting for their rights.

“We, all peasants of Kalibakar are proud and happy for the late President Gus Dur. In his speeches related to agrarian conflicts, Gus Dur

frankly supported peasants. He is our spirit. He is a great person," said a prominent figure in the Kalibakar peasant movement.

In responding to land policies today led by President Joko Widodo, our respondent stated, "Pak Jokowi is doing good with his certification program. However, his policy does not concern lands under dispute, such as Kalibakar. His policy should protect the lands that we have cultivated. If we can certify that, we will be very grateful. We are also waiting for Pak Jokowi's pro-peasant policy in Kalibakar, as shown by Gus Dur," said the FORKOTMAS chairman.

These interview transcripts indicate that the national socio-political conditions, be it chaotic or stable, greatly influences the dynamics of the peasant's movement. However, stable political situation without a pro-peasant political will is not supportive for peasant movements. The absence of security control will cause the peasants to lose momentum.

The Kalibakar peasants have been experienced such a situation since the 2000s. The movement has gotten weaker where it mostly has been waiting for the activation phase. So far, the activation phase only involves words of mouth in social encounters. Among other ways are speeches about the Kalibakar peasant movement in scientific forums, explanations to academia and researchers, hearing for Malang Regency government officials, and gathering community leaders outside Kalibakar. What's App Group is also used as social media to support movement leaders. In 2019, 21 years after 1998, the dynamics of the peasant's movement had loosened, or to say: at its lowest point.

"Now the situation is different from 1998. We are now struggling alone; our network friends who used to support us may be busy with their jobs. However, we still hope that the support will strengthen again", said a respondent. They also added, "The movement of the Kalibakar peasants only follows the times. Time will give us signs. If time takes us to move, we will move. If there are no signs, we will wait first."

In the historical record of the struggle of Kalibakar peasants in 1998, several main supporting elements of the movement network include FORKOTMAS, the NGO Enlightenment Malang, the NGO Papan Jati East Java, LBH Pos Malang, all political parties, all factions in the DPRD, the Regional Government, lecturers and student activists, the press, religious leaders of Malang Raya, and civil society forums in Malang Raya. Apart from these main networks, there are other support groups with a positive contribution to the success of the Kalibakar peasant reclaiming/looting movement.

Reasons, why the movement network is weakening can be extracted from our respondents' answers. First, former Kalibakar plantation land has now been controlled by peasants. Such temporary achievements made the peasants feel they have 'succeeded' in the initial stage – which is reclaiming – where it now becomes necessary to build a new movement. The new movement should be oriented towards the development of the peasants themselves and society.

"We have to change the direction of the movement. In the past, it required mental, physical, and courage to take the land; but now it calls for human development," explained one leader.

Second, the supporting network element expects the peasants to carry out internal consolidation where they have abilities to face their own problems.

"The support network hopes that Kalibakar peasants, through FORKOTMAS, can build themselves following the vision and mission they have proclaimed. Principally, all elements of our support network still support the Kalibakar peasants agenda. They are all still behind us," reported the peasants.

Third, the decline in solidarity among peasants have taken over their original aims of land certification. For several times the peasants were deceived by people outside Kalibakar, whom they thought to assist the process of land certification, but turned out deceiving them. Despite no meaningful conflict between peasants, there is a decrease in the level of trust between them.

Fourth, the passing of three central figures from FORKOTMAS have emotionally affected the loyalty of the members. By age, FORKOTMAS leaders today are relatively young and of similar ages with their members. In Javanese, this resulted in the loss of 'elderly' (old and wise) figures to rely on. This leadership model reflects types of leadership to succeed Kalibakar peasant movement, who was charismatic and traditional. This is in contrast with the leadership needed today, where it tends to be formal and legal as demanded by modern times.

Fifth, there is a transformation of the form of the network from a formal-symmetric network (as built-in 1998) to a family-symmetric network between peasants figures, government officials, and civil society leaders in Malang Raya.

"We still keep in touch with several high-ranking local government officials, campus activists, political party leaders, and civil society leaders. In fact, I am often trusted as a resource person to talk about the Kalibakar peasants movement", emphasized the Chairman of FORKOTMAS.

Hence, it can be concluded that the weakening of support for Kalibakar peasant movement are:

- a. A sense of temporary satisfaction as the peasants has 'successfully' controlled the land being fought for.
- b. The former elements of the support network resigned to be in the backline, with the intention that the peasants were able to build themselves following the vision and mission of the movement.
- c. The decline in solidarity and cohesiveness among peasants.
- d. The passing of central figures.
- e. Transformation of the network form from a formal-symmetric network to a family-symmetric network.

4.1.3 The quiet period of Kalibakar peasant movement

According to the Law of PTPN, HGU XII Kalibakar has ended in 2012. The plantation party hence attempted to apply for

a contract extension permit to the government. Yet, until this present research is carried out, the extension permit has not been issued.

"It is impossible to decline because the real field conditions of all ex-plantation lands have become agricultural lands for the Kalibakar peasants. If the government has the heart, we believe they will support us. The government would like to see Kalibakar peasants whose lives are now relatively prosperous," answered one respondent when being asked why the extension permit had not been issued.

Apart from the efforts to apply for a permit extension, a respondent stated that PTPN XII has also complained about Kalibakar peasants to the East Java Regional Police for looting land belonging to a plantation. Several prominent peasants who are members of FORKOTMAS have been summoned for questioning, but not a single peasant has been named a suspect. The development of this kind of legal process has further strengthened the conviction of the Kalibakar peasants that in due course, all land that is currently cultivated by the peasants will be granted a CO by the government.

"The lives of Kalibakar peasants are now calm and happy, but they remain alert to all possibilities that may occur. Therefore, in our opinion, the union of peasants is fixed. This is non-negotiable," said the peasants figure enthusiastically.

It is indicated that the movement's leaders always try to avoid any potential conflicts between members of the peasant's movement. Such strategy follows the principle of *'wani ngalah luhur wekasane'* (daring to give in will result in nobility).

During the Post-reformation period, after the peasants regained their plantation land, the FORKOTMAS peasants organization aimed to change the direction of the movement.

"The reclaiming program has been successful, now is the time to develop a peasants community. Our focus now is the consolidation of the FORKOTMAS organization, improving the quality of human resources, and the establishment of educational institutions, as well as economic institutions in the Kalibakar area," explained the Chairman of FORKOTMAS.

In relation to this agenda, the Chairman acknowledged that the program had not been running well. "Just like in school or college, the Kalibakar peasants movement is currently in a period of calm. Preparation for the exam. Unfortunately, this quiet period has been too long," he added with a laugh.

Our respondent explained that the leaders of the peasant's movement – the second generation of FORKOTMAS leadership – are doing self-reflection on what to do to bring the lives of the Kalibakar peasants into prosperity as they have always dreamed of. It is also said that many parties often question the continuation of the Kalibakar movement. One issue that is often asked by the public is related to the land certification program.

"Land certification must be strived for as hard as possible for the peasants, but the organizational development and development of peasants society is also one of our big dreams. Just imagine what the world will say if the Kalibakar area becomes a developed area. Surely many people will learn about how to build a peasants society in Kalibakar," said the Chairman of FORKOTMAS while looking far ahead.

The leader of FORKOTMAS explained that the calmness of the peasants did not mean that they were not thinking. *"We are all contemplating, thinking, and continuing to communicate with all elements of the people of Malang Raya who support the Kalibakar peasants movement. Without the support of the wider community of Malang Raya, we cannot do anything. We always ask for prayers and support from everyone,"* said the Chairman.

The excerpts explicate that the current leaders of FORKOTMAS will try to benefit from the political moment of 2020 Regency Election as a point of the revival of true brotherhood among the peasants of Kalibakar.

In conclusion, an inventory of explanations regarding the weakening of the Kalibakar peasants movement are as follows:

- a. The peasants are always thinking, contemplating, imagining, and dreaming of the continuation of the Kalibakar movement.
- b. Movement leaders often discuss the continuation of the movement with fellow movement activists, government officials, and community leaders, while maintaining their commitment to continue support the Kalibakar peasant movement.
- c. Peasants pay great attention to and consider input from the general public on how to proceed from the stages of the movement to become a movement for organizational development and community development.

4.2 Discussion

It was previously explained that the analytical framework in this research is the Symbolic Interactionism Theory by George H. Mead. This theory is chosen based on the objective of revealing the micro-subjective world of FORKOTMAS management and the prominent figures of the South Kalibakar peasant movement in Malang. Hence, this section discusses the results of the research with the existing theoretical framework.

This present research analyzes the process of social interaction between individuals (peasant figures) and other individuals (other peasant figures), as well as between peasant figures and society (represented by community leaders) mediated by the distribution of symbols of the peasant movement, as depicted in social situations, words, thoughts, and other things.

4.2.1 Social process, internal self-interaction, and individual thoughts

Findings of this present research showed that the actors behind the peasant movement understand society's expectations where the social movement is continued: not only

to obtain a CO, but also for the purpose of community life. This broadly covers the lives of the peasants named in solidarity, integrity, kinship, mutual cooperation, and welfare. In this case, thoughts, suggestions, and motivations are the social symbols that support for Kalibakar peasants.

The awareness of the movement actors is manifested from the social processes they undergo, especially through interaction with friends, neighbours, and cross-activist networks. The social gathering was not only discussing the continuation of the movement but also highlighting the struggle of Kalibakar peasants. Inevitably, the raised social has become stimuli for the peasants to think further about the continuation of their movement. In this stage, the movement is interpreted as an activation phase to prepare for further social mobilization steps or to maintain the peasants' commitments to the struggle.

Based on the theory of symbolic interactionism (Mead et al., 2015), it can be said that peasants' thoughts (*mind*) are resulting from their dialogues with the actor following a series of experiences in social life (*social process*). This analysis lends strong support to Mead's notion where a social process precedes individual thinking, despite the needs of the thought process of a thinking modality in the form of knowledge. Our research contests that both micro- and macro-objective are intertwined, working dialectically, and inseparable.

4.2.2 Social experience and self-dialectic

As the sayings – experience is the best teacher – this social movement best describes the self of Kalibakar peasants. Following Mead, self refers to two interrelated things: *I* and *me*. "*I*" is an element of self articulated in the form of personal drives or motives, self-expectations, ambitions, and self-orientation, while "*me*", is an element of self resulting from the articulation of the voices and expectations of society, formulated in the form of social morals. Thus, peasants' self is born from a dialectical work between *I* and *me* of each individual peasant in Kalibakar.

Social interaction between individual peasants and other peasants, and/ or with the general public in the arena of social movements, becomes a moment of peasants' *self* to capture focused symbols as significant gestures. *Self* serves as a material for thinking and reflection where one can share symbols meaningfully (significant communication) to other individuals. In Kalibakar peasant movement, the symbols refer to the expressions of: 'continue the struggle', 'the land belongs to our ancestors', 'unified peasants cannot be defeated', or gestures in the form of a fist while saying 'keep the spirit'.

Peasants' self-esteem functions to control the behavior of Kalibakar peasants in their social life. Kalibakar peasants can monitor and control their attitudes, actions, and behaviour following the results of the dialectical work of *me* and *I* in the self of each peasant. Therefore, even though the public of Malang Raya (*society*) precedes the thoughts of the peasants (*mind*), the peasants themselves (*self*) remain having special autonomy to determine the desired direction and form of action. In other words, despite the public's desire on Kalibakar peasants to continue their struggle, the movement will never take place if the peasants themselves do not take action.

The theoretical implications of this research are in line with micro-sociological theories where individuals are actors for themselves. Individuals do not necessarily submit

and obey social facts, and that the social process (*society*) precedes the individual thoughts (*mind*) is resulted from *self work*. Therefore, what happens in Kalibakar is the reflection of dialectic between *society*, *self*, and *mind*. The symbolic interactionism of the Kalibakar peasants is depicted as follow figure 2.




FIGURE 2. Symbolic interactionism of kalibakar Peasants

5. CONCLUSIONS

Based on the findings and discussions, several conclusions of our research are formulated as follows:

1. The stagnation of Kalibakar peasant movement occurs because the peasants have felt 'successful' to control the land as aspired since the Japanese colonial era.
2. In fact, no stagnation presents in an absolute sense because both leaders and members of the peasant movement continues contemplating and informally moving to preserve readiness if they have to move at any time.
3. The leaders of the peasant movement are preparing to develop a new form and strategy of the movement into a community organization and development, in particular, in the fields of human resources, economic institutions, and education in the Kalibakar area.
4. Local government officials, community leaders, and elements of the main support network of the movement remains committed to supporting the Kalibakar peasants self-building program
5. The Kalibakar phenomenon is an articulation of a dialectical mechanism between the thoughts of peasants (*mind*), peasants themselves (*self*), and the public of Malang Raya (*society*).

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